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Reform, Renegotiation and Referendum
The UK’s Uncertain European Future  
 Dr Julie Smith
Introduction
On 10 November 2015, UK Prime Minister David Cameron sent 
a long-awaited letter to the European Council President, Don-
ald Tusk, outlining the issues he believes need to be resolved 
before recommending that the UK should remain a member 
of the European Union. Such a letter is unusual – but so too 
is the prospect of a member state actively considering leav-
ing the EU.1 Traditionally, the EU has been seen as a magnet, 
[ 3 / 2016 ]
1 True, Greenland left in 1985, having secured home rule from Denmark in 
1979.
Summary
The UK stands on the brink of a momentous decision: wheth-
er to leave or remain in the European Union. Unlike all the 
other states that have sought late entry to the EU, the UK did 
not hold a referendum on whether to join in 1973: the deci-
sion was taken on the basis of a parliamentary vote. How-
ever, in 1975 voters were asked whether they wished to stay 
in the European Community, and a strong vote to remain was 
thought to have resolved the matter. However, in 2013, divi-
sions within the Conservative Party led Prime Minister David 
Cameron to promise to engage in reform of the EU and to 
renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership before holding a 
referendum on whether to stay in. It was a high-risk, high-
stakes proposition. Cameron must persuade his party, the 
British electorate and his partners in the other EU member 
states of the merits of his case. The renegotiation covers four 
areas of concern for the UK: economic governance, competi-
tiveness, sovereignty, and immigration. To some British Eu-
rosceptics, the demands seem woefully inadequate; to fel-
low EU leaders, they pose significant difficulties. The formal 
negotiations began in late 2015, after months of exploratory 
talks with the other member states, and are expected to be 
completed by the end of February, with the referendum com-
ing as early as June 2016. While those who seek to leave the 
EU have been honing their arguments at least since the 1993 
Maastricht Treaty, just what they envisage leaving the EU to 
look like is unclear. Brexit could take many forms, represent-
ing a journey to an unknown destination.
attracting aspiring members from across Europe, and even Asia 
and North Africa. The fact that a long-standing member is now 
thinking about withdrawal has caused concern and frustration 
within the EU. While most of the other 27 member states wish the 
UK to remain and believe it has a positive contribution to make, 
they are also frustrated by the UK’s repeated attempts to opt out 
of various aspects of integration. These feelings are compounded 
by the fears of European leaders that if the UK secures further 
unilateral ‘preferential treatment’, as it could be construed, 
Eurosceptics in their own countries will begin to demand further 
reforms. Thus, following his re-election as Prime Minister in 
May 2015, Cameron faced a difficult few months negotiating the 
reforms he deems necessary for the UK to remain in the EU. Once 
the outcome of the negotiations is clear, he will have to be able to 
persuade those who are sceptical about membership – not least 
in his own party – that the reforms are sufficiently significant to 
warrant a vote in favour of remaining. He is playing a high-stakes 
game, and the eventual outcome is uncertain.
A Reluctant European
The UK’s relationship with its European neighbours has been 
difficult ever since the Schuman Declaration of 1950 heralded 
the start of what became known as European integration. The 
Labour Party was reluctant to engage in a ‘rich man’s club’ but 
the Conservatives also gave it a cool reception. Having rejected 
the chance of being a founder member, the UK soon recognized 
the economic success ‘the Six’ were enjoying while its own 
economy was failing to thrive. However, two attempts to join 
were rebuffed by French President Charles de Gaulle; it was 
only with his departure from office in 1969 that the UK could 
enter. The Labour government’s application of 1967, which 
was re-opened in 1969, had come from a position of economic 
weakness rather than a new-found passion for Europe. However, 
the negotiations were completed by Conservative PM Edward 
Heath, the most deeply committed ‘European’ prime minister 
the UK has seen. Heath rejected the idea of putting the prospect 
of membership to British citizens in a referendum – as all other 
would-be member states did, both ahead of the 1972 expansion 
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and all other enlargements.2 The Labour Party shifted in an 
anti-Community direction while in opposition; and in 1974 
Harold Wilson fought the two general elections on a promise 
of giving voters a say on whether to remain in the Community. 
Previously hostile to the idea of a referendum, which had 
been advocated by left-winger Tony Benn, Wilson gradually 
recognized that a plebiscite might be the deus ex machina 
that could hold his party together on this divisive issue.3 
First, however, he sought to renegotiate the UK’s terms of 
membership of the Community, which he dismissed as hav-
ing been ‘Tory terms’. While the renegotiation was character-
ized as ‘a cosmetic operation’ by one of Wilson’s strongest 
supporters at the time, sometime German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt, it provided enough for the British Prime Minister 
to recommend staying in the Community. In the subsequent 
referendum, British voters duly said ‘Yes’ by a two-to-one 
majority. The question mark over Britain’s relationship had 
been removed – most assumed for good.4 
The rise of British Euroscepticism
However, the 1975 referendum did not resolve Britain’s thorny 
relations with the rest of the EU. Within the EU, Britain became 
known as an ‘awkward partner’,5  while domestically ‘Europe’ 
divided first the Labour Party and, from the time of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the Conservatives. The rise of the Eurosceptic 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) from the 1990s highlighted 
concerns over the direction of European integration after the 
Maastricht Treaty – on which, as usual, British voters had not 
had a direct say by way of a referendum. For nearly twenty 
years, party leaders raised the spectre of holding a referen-
dum, whether on entering the euro or ratifying treaties, only 
to draw back. The continuing rise of UKIP and the growth of 
Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party, both among 
the increasingly elderly grassroots members and MPs anxious 
about their electoral prospects as they watched UKIP’s growing 
electoral progress, needed to be addressed. By the time of the 
2010 general election, the Conservatives were committed to a 
‘referendum lock’ before any new powers could be transferred 
to the EU. Nonetheless, sceptics were bitterly disappointed that 
no referendum would be held on the Lisbon Treaty.6 
The 2010 election created an unprecedented peacetime coali-
tion government between the pro-EU Liberal Democrats and 
the increasingly divided Conservative Party.7 Tory backbench-
ers, furious with a leader who had failed to secure a majority 
government and thus prevented them from securing the jobs 
in government to which they aspired, felt at liberty to attack 
the Prime Minister on European matters on a regular basis, 
most notably demanding a referendum on whether the UK 
should remain in the EU. Ironically, while Cameron personally 
opposed such a referendum, the Deputy Prime Minister, Lib-
eral Democrat Nick Clegg, had proposed an In/Out referendum 
at the time of Lisbon Treaty ratification. In office, however, 
Clegg took the line that there should not be an ad-hoc referen-
dum. The two leaders pushed through the EU Act 2011, paving 
the way for a referendum the next time there should be treaty 
reform in the EU – then expected to be a distant prospect. The 
demands for citizens to have a say did not diminish, and Cam-
eron eventually responded to his party’s demands.
The Promise of a Referendum – and of Peace (in the 
Conservative Party) 
On 23January 2013, Cameron made a landmark speech at 
Bloomberg in which he outlined his vision of Britain in Europe, 
highlighting areas which he believed required reform and, most 
importantly, pledging to hold an In/Out referendum on mem-
bership of the EU by the end of 2017, should the Conservatives 
be returned to power in the May 2015 general elections.8 This 
move appeared to be a master stroke – his backbenchers were 
delighted that Cameron had made the commitment to hold a 
referendum, so he could hold his fractious party together. It 
also gave him the perfect message for the electorate at the 2014 
European Parliament and 2015 general elections: ‘Reform, 
renegotiation, referendum: Labour and the Liberals won’t give 
you a referendum; UKIP can’t give you a referendum, only the 
Tories can.’ While the issue was obviously more complex than 
the Tory leader implied, it worked for Cameron for two and a 
half years: his party held together, Europe did not dominate the 
2015 general election and while the results of the European 
Parliament elections in 2014 were disappointing – UKIP came 
first with nearly 30% of the vote, albeit on a low turnout – the 
Tories won the general election by a majority of 12 seats. Cam-
eron was now the Prime Minister of a single-party government. 
The time had come to deliver on his European policy.
The ‘three Rs’ had the virtue of simplicity in speaking to the 
electorate – but the election victory meant that Cameron would 
now have to articulate what he meant by ‘reform’ and explain 
what he hoped to renegotiate before holding the referendum 
that would decide Britain’s future in Europe. The Bloomberg 
Speech and the Conservative Party Manifesto of 2015 both con-
tain the core of what Cameron hopes to secure from Britain’s 
European partners. 
Recognizing the importance of securing support from the other 
27 EU leaders before the formal negotiations began, Cameron, 
along with Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, For-
eign Secretary Philip Hammond and Europe Minister David 
Lidington, began a series of bilateral meetings with colleagues 
across the EU. By early autumn there was some frustration 
among the UK’s interlocutors, who complained that they did 
not know what the Prime Minister wanted. Nor were they 
impressed at the suggestion that they could find the answers 
to their queries by looking at the Bloomberg Speech or the 
2 Norway is the only state to have rejected membership in such an accession 
referendum – twice.
3 Under the UK’s unwritten constitution, Parliament is sovereign, and in 
1972 there was no provision for referenda (which are in any case not le-
gally binding in the UK)  – they are not legally binding in the UK because 
Parliament is sovereign….).
4 See, for example, Harold Wilson, The Times, 7 June 1975, reprinted 6 June 
2015.
5 The term is widely used, but is most commonly attributed to Stephen 
George, thanks to his volume, An Awkward Partner – Britain in the Euro-
pean Community (Oxford: OUP, 3rd edition 1998).
6 The Conservative Party had been committed to holding a referendum on 
Lisbon if they took office before the Treaty had come into effect. 
7 For a fuller discussion of the development of European policy at the time, 
see Julie Smith, ‘Europe: The Coalition’s Poisoned Chalice’ in Anthony Sel-
don and Mike Finn, eds, The Coalition Effect, 2010–15 (Cambridge: CUP, 
2015, pp. 372-98.
8 This became known simply as ‘The Bloomberg Speech’. It is available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg
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Conservative Party manifesto.9 That Cameron was reluctant 
to reveal his hand too early or too publicly was not surpris-
ing – this was, after all, a negotiation. However, it was clearly 
essential that the other 27 leaders as well as the Commission – 
which would be conducting the formal (re)negotiation – should 
have a clear indication of what Cameron was looking for. The 
problem was that he was trying to play a complex multi-level 
game. He needed to find a package that his European partners 
could accept, bearing in mind that they also have electorates 
to whom they are answerable and growing Eurosceptic forces 
for whom concessions to the UK would provide ammunition 
for making similar demands for their own countries. At home 
he needed to present a sufficiently robust package to be able 
to keep the Eurosceptics in his own party onside, even before 
he addressed the issue of how to win over the voters. Thus, in 
the months immediately after the election the aim was to try 
to ascertain precisely what might be achievable in the EU, and 
reconcile that with what would be acceptable at home.
By October the demands to know what Cameron wanted were 
met with a promise to write a letter to European Council Presi-
dent Tusk. The promised letter was sent on 10 November, when 
Cameron also gave a speech at Chatham House, in which he 
harked back to his Bloomberg Speech and flagged up the con-
tent of the letter to Tusk.10 For those who had been following the 
development of his policy carefully, there were few surprises in 
Cameron’s wish list. Four areas of concern were identified: 
• Economic governance – in short, an attempt to ensure that 
non-Eurozone EU members like the UK are not at any disad-
vantage through being outside the common currency – while 
this is predominantly of concern to the UK, the quid pro quo 
is that the UK would not seek to impede the Eurozone from 
seeking deeper integration; 
• Competitiveness – this is part of the UK’s reform agenda but 
wholly in line with the work of the Juncker Commission and 
thus can be seen as something to benefit all 28, not just the UK; 
• Sovereignty – a long-standing concern ever since accession; 
Cameron’s proposals include increased powers for national 
parliaments, full implementation of subsidiarity and, most 
controversially in this area, agreement that UK should no 
longer be bound by the concept of ‘ever closer union’; 
• Immigration – by which is meant limiting access to benefits 
for EU citizens moving to the UK under free movement rights.
The contents of the letter were immediately made available and 
presented to the House of Commons by Europe Minister Lid-
ington. Eurosceptic Tory MPs were underwhelmed: ‘Is that the 
sum total of the Government’s position in this renegotiation?’ 
wondered Bernard Jenkin, while veteran Chair of the House 
of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Sir William Cash, 
called it ‘a pig in a poke’.11 Meanwhile, Cameron’s European 
counterparts raised concerns that some of the demands would 
be very difficult to achieve. The respective reasons of the two 
groups illustrate the fine line Cameron must walk to secure Brit-
ain’s future in the EU – assuming, as most do, that he person-
ally does wish Britain to remain in a reformed EU. The previous 
months of discussions were termed ‘technical discussions’ in 
Cameron’s letter to Tusk, intended to pave the way for formal 
negotiations leading to an agreement at the 18/19 February 
European Council meeting and a referendum in mid-2016.12 
The Referendum
While the referendum does not formally need to be held until 
31 December 2017, political and logistical reasons necessi-
tate its being held no later than spring 2017: the UK is due 
to hold the rotating presidency of the EU in the second half 
of 2017, and elections are due in both France and Germany. 
While a referendum could technically be conducted during the 
Presidency, this is seen as undesirable. The UK government 
also appears keen to hold the referendum by the end of June 
2016 if possible, to avoid a recurrence of the 2015 migrant 
crisis affecting public opinion. Agreement on the reform and 
renegotiation parts of the 3Rs would technically give sufficient 
time for this to happen, according to the rules laid down in the 
European Union Referendum Act 2015, which received Royal 
Assent on 17 December 2015. Failing that, September 2016 
would be the most likely alternative date.
The referendum question will be: ‘Should the UK remain in 
the European Union or leave the European Union?’ – following 
advice from the Electoral Commission that this would be the 
most neutral wording, least biased towards either remaining 
or leaving. Fairness and neutrality were key issues raised by 
Eurosceptics when the legislation passed through Parliament, 
as they recalled the 1975 referendum, which they believed had 
not been fair. Similar concerns were raised over the proposed 
funding for the referendum, which sceptics argued was skewed 
towards those who wished to remain – although it appears that 
those seeking to leave are already well funded, if the constant 
flow of media stories is to be believed. The Electoral Commis-
sion is expected to designate two umbrella organizations, one 
for the Remain side and one for the Leave side, which will 
receive £7m each of state funding as well as certain broad-
casting and other rights.13 There are numerous groupings on 
both sides of the argument, but those seeking to remain have 
broadly coalesced around Britain Stronger in Europe (BSE), 
which is expected to be the designated Remain body. The Leave 
side appears more divided, as two rival groups, Vote Leave and 
Leave.eu, vie for support and money. If they cannot decide 
between themselves which should lead the Leave campaign, 
the Electoral Commission has the power to decide.14 
Key campaign issues will include questions of sovereignty and 
borders, the economy and security, as well as Britain’s place 
in the world. UKIP especially is keen to stress the importance  9 These points were raised in numerous off-the-record meetings with politi-
cians and officials from the UK, other member states and the Commission 
in September and October 2015.
10 Cameron’s letter to Tusk is available on-line at : https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/
Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf. His speech at Chatham House is available at: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/events/
special/20151110DavidCameron%20%28NEW%29.pdf.
11 House of Commons Hansard, 10 November 2015, col. 236 and col.229.
12 There was speculation in mid-January that an additional summit could be 
held later in February if a final deal had not been ironed out by 19 February.
13 The formal rules are outlined in the Schedules of the European Union Ref-
erendum Act 2015. 
14 The divisions across the parties were highlighted by the fact that UKIP 
leader Nigel Farage supports Leave.eu, while the party’s sole MP favours 
Vote Leave.
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of the UK’s links with the Commonwealth. However, while the 
offer of the Remain side is quite clear – the status quo, plus 
or minus – that of the Leave side is less so. Would the UK join 
the European Economic Area and take on the ‘fax democracy’ 
that Norway has?15 Or a series of bilateral agreements within 
the European Free Trade Agreement alongside Switzerland? 
What ‘leave’ means has not been defined, and has been 
deemed a leap into the unknown. The government and many 
pro-Europeans argue that it is for those who seek to leave to 
explain what it would mean, believing that their difficulties in 
doing so would help the Remain side. Yet such a move could 
increase the risk of misinformation during the campaign, if 
those seeking to leave overstate the options available and 
those advocating remain overplay the negatives. 
The ambiguity comes in large part precisely because no state 
has ever triggered Article 50, the provision introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty under which withdrawal can be negotiated. By 
definition the negotiable outcomes cannot be known until 
Article 50 is triggered, after a vote to leave, and there are no 
precedents that can be followed. Jean-Claude Piris has indi-
cated there are seven possible alternatives to full member-
ship, none of which would give the UK unfettered access to 
the EU market without considerable costs – including ‘con-
tinued budget contributions, continued free movement of 
labour, and continued supremacy of EU law over British law 
in the single market’.16  One final area of uncertainly relates to 
Scotland. The Scottish National Party, which is deeply com-
mitted to keeping Scotland in the EU, has indicated that it 
might call for a second Scottish independence referendum, 
should the outcome of the EU referendum be for the UK as a 
whole to withdraw from the EU.17 
Conclusions
As David Cameron moves to conclude his reform and renegoti-
ation with EU partners he faces a party deeply divided over the 
EU. He has asked MPs and MEPs to remain silent on whether 
they wish to remain or leave until after he has completed the 
negotiations. Cameron’s hope is to secure a deal good enough 
for him to be able to recommend that the UK should remain 
in the EU, but he has repeatedly said he ‘rules nothing out’– 
taken to mean that if the deal is not good enough he could 
recommend leaving. Few imagine this will occur. The expecta-
tion is that, like Wilson before him, Cameron will come back 
and claim a good deal for the UK. At that point MPs and even 
ministers will be free to campaign as they wish, since Cabinet 
responsibility will be waived. Yet even before the negotiations 
are complete, some have begun to argue the case for remain-
ing, while others have announced they have given up on Cam-
eron’s negotiations and will campaign to leave. Myriad ‘remain’ 
and ‘leave’ campaign groupings are appearing. Some, such as 
Labour Leave or Conservatives for Britain on the ‘out’ side and 
the Conservative’s European Mainstream on the ‘remain’ side, 
reflect the opinions of members of just one political party; 
others are working on a cross-party basis to ensure greater 
traction for their case. The Liberal Democrats as a party are 
strongly in favour of remaining, while the Labour Party’s posi-
tion is one of remaining in order to reform the EU (the position 
of their new leader, Jeremy Corbyn, is understood to be similar 
to that of Greece’s Syriza: pro-Europe, anti-austerity. 
Ultimately, it is Cameron’s Conservative Party that will be most 
deeply divided on the issue. The promise of reform, renego-
tiation and a referendum offered a short-term opportunity for 
Cameron to hold the party together. However, the result may 
see both his party and country split, should he not manage to 
secure the deal he needs, or win the referendum.
15 Jens Stoltenberg used this term over a decade ago and while the fax may 
have been replaced by email, the concept persists. See Charlemagne, ‘The 
Norwegian option’, The Economist, 7 October 2004.
16 Jean-Claude Piris, If the UK votes to leave – The seven alternatives to EU 
membership (London: Centre for European Reform, 2016).
17 The first such referendum was held in September 2014. It was expected to 
resolve the matter for a generation; as with the 1975 referendum, it did not 
put paid to the debate.
